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THE USE OF SCREENS TO CURE IMPUTED CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST: WHY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
AND MOST STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS' FAILURE TO
ALLOW SCREENING UNDERMINES THE INTEGRITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION

1.

INTRODUCTION
You are a young associate, fresh out of law
school, hired by a large law firm that deals with
anything from medical malpractice to construction
contracts. After working at the firm for several
years you decide to change firms. You interview
with a number of firms, but after describing the
variety of cases that you have worked on over the
years, the firms admit that they do not want to risk
hiring you and possibly having to turn down future
litigation if a conflict of interest arises. The firms
explain that any conflict you may have with a
potential client will most likely prevent the entire
firm from representing that client. Unfortunately
for you, this is a financial risk the firms are not
willing to take.

The use of screens to cure imputed conflicts of interest has been
an ongoing debate for the American Bar Association (ABA), as
well as state bar associations. l While competing policy reasons
have led to different solutions for different states, only a minority
of states permit the use of screens to cure imputed conflicts of
interest. 2
Screening has been rejected on the basis of the need to protect
the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship?
However, screening can be a useful method that provides clients
the opportunity to truly choose their own counsel, as well as
allowing lawyers greater mobility between firms.4 The practice of
screening essentially prevents an entire firm from being
disqualified from representation when one attorney within the firm
is prohibited from representing a client due to a conflict of
interest. 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Parts III and V.
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 607-08 (4th ed. 2004).
See infra Part ILB. 3.
See infra Parts Il.B.1-3.
See infra Parts Il.B.1-2.
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Under traditional rules pertaining to conflicts of interest, an
entire firm may be disqualified if one lawyer within that firm is
disqualified from representing a client because of confidences
gained in an adverse representation. 6 This imputed disqualification
results from a presumption that knowledge gained by one attorney
is shared by all other attorneys within that firm. 7 In an effort to
"rebut this presumption . . . procedures designed to create an
impermeable barrier to intrafirm exchange of confidential
information" have been "adopt[e]d" by law firms facing
disqualification. 8 Screens "aim to isolate the disqualification to the
lawyer or lawyers infected with the privileged information that is
the source of the ethical problem, and thereby to allow other
attorneys in the firm to carry on the questioned representation free
of any taint of misuse of confidences.,,9 Effective screening
requires law firms to erect timely screens that are strictly enforced
in order to protect client confidences and prevent
disqualification. 10 A law firm using a screen is responsible for
ensuring that the screen effectively protects a client's confidential
information. II
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model
Rules), as well as state rules of professional conduct promote
lawyers as "representative[s] of clients," and "officers of the legal
system . . . . ,,12 The legal profession is deemed to be selfregulating and the authority of the Model Rules is grounded in this
unique characteristic,13 but by rejecting the screening process the
ABA and other state bar associations have demonstrated a distrust
in lawyers' abilities to truly self-regulate.
This Comment will first examine the ABA Model Rules
concerning conflicts of interest,'4 the Ethics 2000 Commission's
recommendation to allow for screening' '5 and the House of
Delegates rejection of the amended rule.' Second, this Comment
will discuss how the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers
allows for screening under certain circumstances. 17 Third, this
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense To Law-Firm Disqualification. 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 677, 677-78 (1980).
/d.
/d. at 678.
Jd.
See infra Part 1l.B.1.
7 AM. JUR. 20 Attorneys at Law § 198 (2004).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. § I (2003); See also, e.g, MO
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. § I (2003) (stating that lawyers are
"representative[sJ of clients," and "officers of the legal system ... ").
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. §§ 10-12.
See infra Part Il.A.
See infra Part IIl.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV,
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Comment will look at other states, Maryland in particular, which
permit screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest. 18 These
states will serve as examples of the successful implementation of
screening procedures. 19 Finally, this comment will demonstrate
that in failing to adopt screening procedures, the ABA and other
state bar associations have in fact undermined the integrity of the
legal profession. 20
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE ABA MODEL
RULES
The lepal profession is one of continually increasing lateral
mobility,2 so that lawyers frequently find themselves moving
between firms during the course of their career?2 This increased
mobility gives rise to a growing number of conflicts of interest
concerning the representation of fonner and current clients?3 The
ABA Model Rules concerning conflicts of interest are aimed at
protecting client confidences during representation and beyond,
even when one lawyer migrates between finns. 24 Importantly, the
ABA Model Rules specifically address the importance of the
confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship.25
The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules states, "[a] lawyer
should keep in confidence information relating to representation of
a client . . . . ,,26 The theory being that in order to zealously
represent a client and encourage full disclosure, a lawyer must
guarantee complete confidentiality throughout the course of
representation and beyond. 27

A.

ABA Model Rules 1.9 & 1.10

ABA Model Rule 1.9 addresses the responsibility that an
attorney has to fonner c1ients?8 Rule 1.9(b) states:
A lawyer shall not knowingly represent
a person in the same or a substantially
18.
19.

20.
21.

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts VI-VII.
See Robert A. Creamer, Three Myths About Lateral Screening. 13 THE PROF.
LAW. 20 (2002) (stating tbat opponents of screening have often "characterized
lateral lawyers as 'side-switching' lawyers").
RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 2, at 606-07.
See id. at 607.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 & 1.10 (2003); see
also id. R. 1.9 cmts. 4-9 (addressing the meaning of Rule 1.9 as it relates to
lawyers moving between firms).
See id. R. 1.6. cm!.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.6. cmts. 1,2, 17.
See id. R. 1.9(b).
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related matter in which a fum with
which the lawyer fonnerly was
associated had previously represented a
client
(1) whose interests are materially
adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had
acquired infonnation protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to
the matter; unless the fonner client
gives informed consent, confumed in
writing?9
By limiting a lawyer's ability to represent certain persons,
Rule 1.9 attempts to protect clients from worrying that information
they disclose to their attorney could later be used against them in
another matter. 30 Rule 1.10 goes even further to protect client
confidences by limiting a law firm's ability to represent certain
persons when an attorney within the firm is individually
disqualified from representing a client. 3 !
In particular, ABA Rule 1.10 addresses the issue of imputation
of conflicts of interest, stating that:
When a lawyer has tenninated an
association with a fum, the fum is not
prohibited from thereafter representing
a person with interests materially
adverse to those of a client represented
by the formerly associated lawyer and
not currently represented by the fum
unless: the matter is the same or
substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented
the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the fum
has information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1. 9(c) that is material to the
matter. 32
Rules 1.9 and 1.10 are designed to ensure that attorneys remain
33
loyal to their clients.
Additionally, Rule 1.10(c) allows for
29.

30.

31.
32.
33.

!d.
Id. R. 1.9; see also id. R. 1.9 em!. 8 (stating, in part, that "[pJaragraph (e)
provides that infonnation acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a
client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the
disadvantage of the client").
See id. R. l.l Ora).
Id. R. I.10(b).
See id. R. 1.9 cmt. & R. 1.1 0 cmts. 2-3.
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removal of imputation if the former or affected client gives
informed consent;34 however, there are some situations where the
conflict of interest is considered so severe that a client's informed
.
. 35
consent WI'11 not remove the ImputatIOn.

B.

Screening-The "Chinese Wall" Defense

A screen is a method which can address the risk that is created
by attorneys who desire to migrate between firms. 36 Specifically,
"[l]aw reformers borrowed the concept of the 'Chinese Wall,' an
institutional mechanism long used in banks, securities, and
investment banking firms to segregate functions among separate
departments and to insure that confidential information in one did
not find its way into another.,,37 Although a primary concern
relating to screening is whether it is really an effective measure to
protect client confidences,38 it is clear that disqualification is a
drastic measure that interferes with a client's right to choose
counse1. 39
34.

See id. R. 1.I0(c). Comment e to Rule 1.10 provides that informed consent
"denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the
lawyer has communicated adequate infonnation and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct." ld. R. 1.10 cmt. e. Specifically, Rule I.IO(c) allows for the affected
client to waive the imputation by giving infonned consent under the requirements
set forth in Rule l.7(b). ld. R. l.l O( c). Rule I. 7(b), in tum, provides that even if
a concurrent conflict of interest exists the lawycr may still represent the client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim
by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives infonned consent, confinned in

writing.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. R. l.7(b).
See id. R. 1.10 cmt. 6 (stating that "[i)n some cases, the risk may be so severe that
the conflict may not be cured by client consent"). With respect to client waivers
of future conflicts, comment 6 references comment 22 of Rule 1.7. See id.
Comment 22 explains that the risk is too severe when the consent is broad and
not specific, "because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have
understood the material risks involved." See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 22. In these cases
the consent will be deemed ineffective. See id.
Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the
Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 156 (2003).
Jd.
Id. at 159.
See Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 1998). In
Kala, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an attorney who switched sides while an
appeal was still pending could not be effectively screened in order to prevent
disqualification of the entire finn. See id. at 268. Although the court closely
analyzed the facts of this particular case in order to avoid an unnecessary
disqualification, it ultimately held that "under this set of egregious facts, the
appearance of impropriety was so great that the attempts made by [the finn
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The Presumption of Shared Confidences

There is a rebuttable presumption that knowledge obtained by
one attorney is shared by all of the other attorneys at that lawyer's
firm.4o The "presumption of shared confidences" exists when an
attorney has previously represented a client with interests adverse
to a potential or current client at that attorney's current firm "in a
The presumption of shared
substantially related matter.'''''
confidences imputes one attorney's disqualification to all other
attorney's in the new firm;42 however, the new firm may be able to
rebut the presumption by erecting a timely and effective screen. 43
2.

Effective Screening

The "Chinese Wall" defense allows a firm to rebut the
presumption that information communicated between a client and
one attorney is automatically shared with all of the other attorneys
in the firm.44 An effective screen blocks the attorney creating the
conflict from obtaining or sharing any knowledge with regard to
Certain factors to be considered III
the particular case. 45
determining the effectiveness of a screen include:
(1) the substantiality of the relationship
between the fonner and current
matters, (2) the time elapsing between
the matters, (3) the size of the firm, (4)
the number of attorneys, (5) the nature
of
the
disqualified
attorney's
involvement in the fonner matter, (6)
the speed with which the wall is
erected, and (7) the strength of the
46
wall.

40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

46.

attempting to avoid disqualification 1to erect a Chinese wall were insufficient to
overcome the appearance of impropriety." Id.
32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 224 (1995).
7 AM. JUR. 20 Attorneys at Law § 198 (1997).
See, e.g., Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verite: Do Rules About Ethical Screens
Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305,
310 (1997).
See infra Part II.B.2,
. See 32 AM. JUR. 20 Federal Courts § 224.
See, e.g., Gerald v. Tumock Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, LLC, 768 N.E.2d
498, 504 (Ind. App. 2002) (stating that the presumption that confidential
information held by one attorney in a firm is shared with all of the attorneys in
the firm "can be rebutted by a demonstration that specific institutional
mechanisms (e.g., Fire Walls) were implemented to effectively insulate against
any flow of confidential information from the infected attorney to any other
member of his or her present firm") (citations omitted).
Comment, supra note 6, at 715.
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Importantly, "[t]he burden is always on the party relying on this
'Chinese Wall' to demonstrate its existence and effectiveness.,,47
3.

The Use of Screens-Supporters vs. Critics

Those who are against the use of screens to cure imputed
conflicts of interest argue that allowing screening compromises the
integrity of the profession.48 Specifically, critics of screening
insist that clients need the security that comes with reasonable
Ultimately, opposition to
expectations of confidentiality.49
screening methods seems to revolve around one central theme: a
general distrust of lawyers. 50 In those instances where a lawyer is
prohibited from representing a client because of a conflict of
interest, critics of screening believe that disqualification of that
lawyer's entire firm is appropriate in order to protect that lawyer's
former client. 5l Notwithstanding these arguments against the use
of screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest, scholars and
practitioners remain divided on whether individual lawyers should
be screened or entire law firms should be disqualified when
imputed conflicts of interest arise. 52
Those in favor of using screening to avoid disqualification of an
entire firm rebut critics' concerns with important policy issues
regarding an individual's right to choose their own counse1. 53
While proponents of screening argue that there is very little
evidence that former clients have been harmed when screening
mechanisms are put in place, 54 the effect on current clients is
obvious and detrimental. 55 Clearly, a current client may be
prohibited from having the representation he desires; moreover, if
representation has already commenced, "the innocent client suffers

47.
48.
49.

50.
5l.
52.
53.

54.
55.

7 AM. JUR. 20 Attorneys at Law § 198 (1997).
See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Screening Not Enough to Avoid Firm's Disqualification,
1 A.B.A. J. eReport 36 (2002) (LexisNexis).
See id.
Creamer, supra note 21, at 21.
See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 318; see a/so Margaret Graham Tebo, A
Treacherous Path, 86 A.B.A. J. 54 (2000).
See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 306; Tebo, supra note 51, at 55.
See, e.g., Creamer, supra note 21, at 21 (asserting that "[flor every imputed
disqualification based on the rejection of screening, there is a client that loses its
lawyer of choice . . . [a]nd the harm to this client is real, not theoretical");
Comment, supra note 6, at 679 (stating that "[d]isqualification restricts the
client's right to counsel of its own choice, delays the resolution of litigation, and
subjects the client to higher costs").
See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21.
Not only do overly strict ethical rules restrict an attorney's employment
opportunities, they restrict the availability of legal services. Lawyers and firms
will be inclined to refuse to accept representation of smaller clients with matters
that do not generate substantial fees for fear that they would be forced to reject
more lucrative representation in the future. See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 314.
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from

imputed

While disqualification certainly harms the current client,
proponents of screening also argue that disqualification has
become a tactical step, rather than a genuine attempt to protect a
Since
former client when a conflict of interest arises. 57
disqualification has been used as a tool in the litigation process,58
"judges must exercise caution not to paint with a broad brush
under the misguided belief that coming down on the side of
disqualification raises the standard of legal ethics and the public's
respect. ,,59 Proponents of screening further assert that attorneys are
aware of the severe consequences that an attorney faces as a result
of sharing confidences, so a motion for disqualification is usually
"a tactical effort to force the other side to switch firms in
midstream, rather than a move based on genuine concern that
confidential information may be disseminated. ,,60 While it is
argued that disqualification has generally become no more than a
tactical effort,61 proponents of screening also assert that screening
would provide greater mobility for attorneys.62
Those in favor of screening also emphasize the burden that
imputed disqualification puts on a lawyer's mobility in a day and
age when attorneys are constantly changing affiliations for a
variety of reasons. 63 Proponents view screening as a balance
56.
57.

58.

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21.
Tebo, supra note 51, at 55 ("[P]roponents of screening say an even bigger
concern is that some clients will lose their counsel of choice if an adverse party
uses disqualification as a tactical measure.").
See Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrumcnt Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir.
1982). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered a
motion for disqualification with great scrutiny, noting that while some motions to
disqualify counsel are legitimate and imperative, others merely serve the purpose
of interrupting the litigation process and disrupting one's adversary. Id.
Specifically, the court stated that "[motions to disqualify counsel] should be
viewed with extreme caution for they can be misused as techniques of
harassment." Id.
Panduit Corp. v. Allstate Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (holding that screening is merely one method by which a firm may rebut
the presumption of shared confidences in order to avoid imputed
disqualification).
Tebo, supra note 51, at 56.
See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
See Creamer, supra note 21, at 22 ("[T]he inflexible application of the rules of
imputed disqualification without recognition of appropriate screening unduly
restricts the ability of this large group of private lawyers to find new positions. ");
Gibeaut, supra note 48 ("[Disqualification] discourages lawyers from changing
jobs. "); Shapiro, supra note 36, at 140 ("Other conflicts arise as lawyers move
from job to job, and as law firms hire and fire attorneys, and merge with one
another."); Tebo, supra note 51, at 55 ("[T]oday, the legal profession, like the rest
of the business world, is much more fluid, and lawyers are likely to change firms
several times during their careers.").
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between competing policy concerns, so that the confidences of
fonner clients are protected without depriving current clients of
their choice of counsel, or lawyers the ability to change jobs. 64
Although the practice of screening has not always received
much support from the courts,65 the ABA's Ethics 2000
Commission was persuaded that screens can be an effective
method for curing conflicts. 66
III. REVISING THE ABA'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES

A.

Ethics 2000 Commission

In 1997, the Ethics 2000 Commission (the Commission) was
fonned in order to review the ABA Model Rules and suggest
modifications. 67 The Commission was the first thorough review of
the Rules since their adoption in 1983.68 The Commission looked
at the rules concerning conflicts of interest and proposed an
amendment to Rule 1.10, which would allow for screens to cure
imputed conflicts of interest. 69
The proposed amendment was drafted as subsection (c) of Rule
1.10 and stated:
(c)When a lawyer becomes associated
with a finn, no lawyer associated in the
fmn shall knowingly represent a person
in a matter in which that lawyer is
disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless: (1)
the personally disqualified lawyer is
timely screened from any participation
in the matter and is apportioned no part
of the fee there from; and (2) written
notice is promptly given to any affected
former client to enable it to ascertain
compliance with the provisions of this
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21-22 ("Lateral screening would provide
protection for the legitimate concerns of the clients of the lateral's former firm
without inflicting the undeserved punishment of imputed disqualification on the
innocent second client.").
See 32 AM. JUR. 20 Federal Courts § 224 (1995).
See infra Part lILA.
See
American
Bar
Association,
Ethics
2000
Commission,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html(last visited Jan. 18,2006).
See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Foreword to Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or
Professional Responsibility as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2003)
("Although various changes have been made to these rules since their inception
in 1983, Ethics 2000 represented the first attempt to evaluate the Model Rules in
their entirety.").
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (Proposed Rule 2001),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-ruleII0.html(last visited Jan. 18,2006).
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Rule. 70
Additionally, the proposed comment number six following Rule
1.1 O(c) read inter alia, as follows: "[ w ]here the conditions of
paragraph (c) are met, imputation is removed, and consent to the
new representation is not required. Lawyers should be aware,
however, that courts may impose more stringent obligations in
ruling upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending
litigation.,,71 The proposed comment also states that while the rule
does not prohibit the disqualified attorney from receiving a salary
or partnership share that was established by a prior agreement, the
attorney may not receive any other compensation directly related
to the representation from which the lawyer has been screened. 72
The comment additionally specifies that when notice to the clients
is required, it should include a description of the disqualified
lawyer's prior representation, as well as a description of the
screening mechanisms that have been instituted. 73
Perhaps most helpful in understanding the Commission's
reasoning is the Reporter's Explanation memo, which
accompanied the proposed amendment to Rule 1.1 O(c), as well as
the proposed comment. The memo stated, in part:
The Commission is persuaded that
nonconsensual screening in these cases
adequately balances the interests of the
former client in confidentiality of
information, the interests of current
clients in hiring counsel of their choice
(including a law firm that may have
represented the client in similar matters
for many years) and the interests of
lawyers in mobility, particularly when
they are moving involuntarily because
their former law firms have
downsized, dissolved or drifted into
bankruptcy. There are presently seven
jurisdictions that permit screening of
laterals by Rule. The testimony the
Commission has heard indicates that
there have not been any significant
numbers of complaints regarding

70.
71.
72.
73.

ld.
See id. em!. 6.
Jd. ernt. 7.
Jd. ernt. 8.
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lawyers' conduct under these Rules. 74
The Explanation memo clearly states that the Commission
considered the competing policy concerns with regard to screening
and found that this method was an acceptable, perhaps an even
more favorable, alternative to disqualification. 75 Unfortunately,
the ABA House of Delegates was not persuaded by the
Commission's findings. 76

B.

House ofDelegates' Rejection of the Commission's Proposal

The House of Delegates is the policy-making body of the
ABA,77 and any changes to the Model Rules must be approved by
the House. 78 The ABA House of Delegates met in August of 2001
to debate amendments to the Model Rules, and the House vote on
the new amendments was completed in February 2002. 79 In order
to vote on the new amendments, the ABA House of Delegates
considered the Commission's report,80 which included the
Reporter's Explanation memo for each rule for which an
amendment was proposed. 81 Additionally, a Minority Report was
filed by one commissioner who dissented to several of the
proposed amendments. 82 Despite the findings of the Ethics 2000
Commission, the proposed Rule 1.1 O(c) was not included among
the changes made to the ABA Model Rules. 83
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

80.
81.
82.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (Reporter's Explanation of Changes
200 I), http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rule110rcm.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2006).
Jd.
See infra Part III.B.
See
American
Bar
Association,
ABA
Leadership,
http://www.abanet.orglleadership/delegates.html(last visited Jan. 18,2006).
LISA G. LERMAN & PH1LIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 23 (2005).
American
Bar
Association,
Ethics
2000
Commission,
http://abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
Jd.
See
American
Bar
Association,
Ethics
2000
Commission,
http://abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
Lawrence J. Fox, Minority Report, http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-dissent.html
(last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
This dissent is filed, therefore, in the hope that matters raised
here, while they failed to persuade a majority of my fellow
Commissioners, will find a more hospitable reception on the floor of
the House, be the subject of amendments at that time, and result in
successful appeals from my failure of advocacy in the 'court' below.

83.

Id.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 0 (2003) ("A disqualification
prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under conditions
stated in Rule 1.7"), with American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission,
http://abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rulellO.html(last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (stating that a
lawyer shall not knowingly represent a client if the lawyer is disqualified under
Rule 1.9, unless: 1) the lawyer is timely screened and will not receive a portion of
the fee; and 2) written, timely notice is given to the client).
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In the Minority Report submitted by Commissioner Lawrence J.
Fox, he urged the House of Delegates to recognize that the
proposed amendment to Rule 1.10 permitted the use of screens,
which failed to truly protect client confidentiality.84 The Report
quotes from the Preamble of the ABA Model Rules, reiterating that
the legal profession is self-regulating. 85 The Minority Report then
goes on to argue, however, that lawyers may not be trusted to
actually self-regulate when given the opportunity.86 Specifically,
Commissioner Fox argues that client confidences will not be
sufficiently protected when the responsibility of enforcing screens,
or reporting screening violations, is left solely to the lawyers
involved in the conflict. 87
The Minority Report states that "[r]arely if ever will violation
of a screen be communicated to the former client whose
confidences it is intended to protect. A breach of a screen easi7s
could be inadvertent, and lawyers may hesitate to report it." 8
Furthermore, the Minority Report argues that "[t]he change in the
rule also will place a burden on the affected client to enforce
lawyer loyalty through the expense of a motion, when a rule would
mandate lawyer compliance.,,89 Here, the Minority Report seems
to suggest that rules mandating a lawyer's compliance are effective
in regulating a lawyer's actions, or protecting clients' interests. 9o
On the other hand, the Report simultaneously argues that a rule
permitting screening, while still mandating a lawyer's
responsibility to protect confidential communications, would
essentially prove ineffective. 91
The Minority Report also criticizes the proposed amendment to
Rule 1.1 O( c) particularly because the new rule would afford no
extra protection to a client whose lawyer "switch[ es] sides" during
the course of representation. 92 Despite Commissioner Fox's strong
opposition to the use of screens as permitted by the proposed
amendment to Rule 1.10, the Commissioner cites the Restatement
of the Law's rule permitting screening as a more acceptable

84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.

90.
91.
92.

See Fox, supra note 82.
Id (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmb!. § 12 (2003)).
See id
See id "Whom did the commission expect to complain-firms that have used
screens, either in jurisdictions that pennit them or in situations of client consent?
Did the commission really expect firms to confess to negligence or worse, with
loss of business and lawsuits to follow? Really?" ld (quoting Professor Andrew
Kaufman, Address at the Michael Frank Lecture (June 1,2001)).
Id
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id
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compromise. 93
This reasoning suggests that some form of
screening may even be acceptable to such an opponent of the
Ethics 2000 Commission's proposa1. 94
IV. THE RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
PROMOTES SCREENING
The American Law Institute (ALI) began drafting a
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers in 1986, and
completed it in 1998.95 The Restatement, although not binding,
combines general principles of ethics pertinent to practicing
attorneys.96
Moreover, it is essentially consistent with the ABA Model
Rules with regard to conflicts of interest97 and imputation,98 with
93.

94.
95.

96.

97.

See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
124(2)(a) (2000». Commissioner Fox notes that there are certain jurisdictions
that prohibit nonconsensual screening in instances where an attorney switches
sides during the course of representation, but still allow for nonconsensual
screening in other situations. See id. He argues that "[t)his explains why the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 124 recognizes
nonconscnsual screening only if 'any confidential [sic) information
communicated to the personally prohibited lawyer is unlikely to be significant in
the subsequent matter.' The Commission's proposal travels far beyond any such
limitation." fd. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§124). See also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
See Fox, supra note 82.
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT AND OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
359 (2004).

See id.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-122,
132 (2000), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.I.I 0 (2003). Section 132,
entitled "A Representation Adverse to the Interests of a Former Client," states:
Unless both the affected present and former clients consent to the
representation under the limitations and conditions provided in § 122,
a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter may not thereafter
represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter
in which the interests of the former client are materially adverse. The
current matter is substantially related to the earlier matter if:
(I) the current matter involves the work the lawyer performed
for the former client; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that representation of the present
client will involve the use of information acquired in the course
of representing the former client, unless that information has
become generally known.

98.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123, with
MODEl RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.l0. Section 123, entitled, "Imputation of
a Conflict of Interest to an Affiliated Lawyer," statcs:
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the
limitations and conditions provided in § 122 or unless imputation
hereunder is removed as provided in § 124, the restrictions upon a
lawyer imposed by §§ 125-135 also restrict other affiliated lawyers
who:
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the exception that the Restatement permits screening as a means
for removing imputation. 99 Section 124 of the Restatement,
entitled "Removing Imputation," states that imputation can be
cured if the lawyer creating the conflict is screened from
participating in the representation of the client, provided that
timely and ade~uate notice of the screening is provided to any
affected client. 1 0 Although section 124 does permit the use of
screens to cure imputed conflicts of interests, section 124(2)(a)
places one important limitation on the use of screens. IOI That
subsection suggests that a screen should only be used to cure an
imputed conflict of interest when "any confidential client
information communicated to the personally prohibited lawyer is
unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter .... ,,102 The
Restatement's rule regarding the use of screens does not go as far
as the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed amendment to Rule
1.10 attempted to go,103 but section 124 does go further than the
current ABA Model Rules. 104 Specifically, the Restatement
promotes the use of screens, as long as there are safeguards to
protect affected clients,lOS
Despite the ABA House of Delegates's rejection of the Ethics
2000 Commission's proposal to amend Model Rule l.1O,106 some
states have taken action and amended their state model rules to
permit the use of screens. 107

(I) are associated with that lawyer in rendering legal services to
others through a law partnership, professional corporation, sole
proprietorship, or similar association;
(2) are employed with that lawyer by an organization to render
legal services either to that organization or to others to advance
the interests or objectives of the organization; or
(3) share office facilities without reasonably adequate measures
to protect confidential client information so that it will not be
available to other lawyers in the shared office.
REST ATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS § 123.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103

104.

105.
106.
107.

!d. § 124(2)-(3).
Jd. § 124(2)(b)-(c).
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(2)(a). Requiring
that any confidential information communicated to the personally prohibited
lawyer be insignificant in the subsequent matter creates another safeguard
protecting the client's confidential communications. Id.
See supra Part liLA.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124
(promoting screens), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2003) (no
promotion of screens).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(2)-(3).
See supra Part 111.8.
See infra Part V.
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STATES THAT PERMIT SCREENING TO CURE
IMPUTED CONFLICTS

Although most states have adopted the ABA Model Rules, or
have derived their own rules from the ABA's Model Rules or
Model Code,108 a minority of states have chosen to depart from the
ABA Model Rules on the subject of screening. 109

A.

Maryland Rule 1.1O(b) Permits the Use afScreens

Prior to the rejection of the Commission's proposal by the ABA
House of Delegates, Maryland adopted a rule permitting screening
in conflicts cases.
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct
(MRPC) 1.1 O(b) provides, in pertinent part:
When a lawyer becomes, associated
with a fIrm, the fIrm may not
knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter in
which that lawyer, or a fIrm with which
the lawyer was associated, had
previously represented a client whose
interests are materially adverse to that
person unless:
(1 ) the newly associated lawyer has
acquired from the former client no
information protected by Rules 1.6 and
(2) 1.9(b) that is material to the matter;
or the newly associated lawyer is
screened from any participation in the
matter and is aRf0rtioned no part of the
fee therefrom. I
This rule effectively states that a disqualifIed lawyer is screened
if that lawyer is isolated from all material knowledge concerning
the matter, isolated from all contact with the client, and precluded
from discussing the matter with any other individual at the fIrm. III
Maryland's rule permitting screens, Rule 1.10, was amended to
include the language quoted above on December 16, 1999, and the
new rule became effective on January 1,2000. 112 The comment to
this rule provides insight into the policy reasons which persuaded

\08.

\09.
110.
Ill.
112.

Richard J. Magid, Suing Your Own Client: Disqualification? Don't Be So Sure,
29 LITIG. 41 (2003).
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2005).
ld.
See id.
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the Maryland House of Delegates to amend it in order to permit
screening in certain conflict of interest cases. 113
There are several competing policy reasons surrounding the
114
issue of screening, which the comment to Rule l.1O addresses.
While the comment asserts the importance of a former client
having security in knowing that the attorney's loyalty is not
compromised,115 clients should ultimately be free to choose their
own legal counsel. Additionally, the comment maintains that
lawyers should have a certain degree of freedom in moving
between law firms and taking on new clients. I 16 In many cases,
without the ability to use screens, a lawyer desiring to move
between firms can be viewed as too great of a risk to hire, if that
lawyer has the potential to create conflicts of interest in the
future.1I7 Ultimately, this predicament adversely affects both
lawyers and potential clients by imposing unnecessary limits on
each party.
In Stratagene v. Invitrogen Corp.,118 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland evaluated a claim for
disqualification based on imputation under MRPC 1.10, using a
two-step analysis; specifically, by applying Rule 1.10(b)(1), then
Rule 1.1 O(b)(2).119 First, under 1.1 O(b)(1), the court must consider
whether the prohibited lawyer acquired any information protected
by Rules l.6 120 or 1.9(b)121 that was material to the matter. 122 If

113.

114.
115.
116.

117.
118.
119.
120.

121.

See id. R. 1.10 cm!.
[IJt should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in
firms, that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or
another, and that many move from one association to another several
times in their careers. If the concept of imputed disqualification were
defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment
of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to
another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.
Jd.
See id. cmt.
Seeid.
See id.
Shapiro, supra note 36, at 141, 156.
225 F. Supp. 2d 608 (2002).
See id. at 613-14.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(l) (2003). Rule 1.6 mandates
that a lawyer shall not reveal any information obtained from a client during the
course of representation "unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure
is impliedly authorized . . . or the disclosure falls within one of the narrow
exceptions provided for in subsection b of the rule." See id. R. 1.6(a).
See id. Rule 1.10(b)(l). Rule 1.9(b) addresses the duties that lawyers have to
former clients. See id. R. 1.9(b). Further, the rule prohibits a lawyer who has
"formerly represented a client" in a certain matter from "thereafter represent[ingJ
another person in the same or substantially related matter," when the current
client's interests are "materially adverse" to those of the former client. ld. R.
1.9(a); see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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protected information is acquired, the lawyer's conflict will be
imputed to that lawyer's new firm, unless the prohibited lawyer
has been effectively screened. 123 Importantly, the court analyzed
the comment to Rule 1.1 O(b) and asselied that "the burden of proof
regarding access to confidential information should rest upon the
firm whose disqualification is sought.,,124
The Preamble to the MRPC states that, "[t]he legal profession is
largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been
granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique
in this respect because of the close relationship between the
profession and the processes of government and law
enforcement.,,125 Maryland's adoption of the screening process
recognizes the self-regulatory nature of the profession by
entrusting firms with the responsibility of properly screening
attorneys who create a conflict of interest. 126 Importantly, this
process protects against conflicts without automatically
disqualifYing a lawyer, or a law firm, from representing a potential
client. 127

B.

Other States Permitting the Use of Screens

While Maryland's decision to permit screens to cure imputed
conflicts of interest is certainly not the majority position, fourteen
other states have also amended their rules of professional conduct
to permit some type of screening. 128 These rules vary from state to
state, but generally require that the clients affected receive notice
of the screening mechanism, and that the screened lawyer is given

122.

123.

124.
125.

126.
127.

See also Siratagene. 225 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (quoting language from Rule
l.l O(b)(I) requiring that a new lawyer have no infonnation "material to the
matter").
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)(I); see also Stratagene, 225 F.
Supp. 2d at 614 (upholding the requirement in Rule 1.l0(b)(I) that conflicts will
be imputed to finns if a new attorney is not screened effectively).
ld. at 613.
MD. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT, Pmb!. § 10 (2005).
See id. R.l.lOcrnts. 9-10.
See id. R. 1.10 crnt. 8. See also id. R. 1.10 cmt. 6 ("Where conditions of
paragraph e [describing the screening process1are met, imputation is removed ..

.").
128.

See 17A ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(d) (2004); DEL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.l0(c)(l) (2005); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.I0(b)(2) (2004); IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:1.7 & 32:1.10 (2005);
MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(d)(2)(ii); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)(l) (2005); 52 MINN. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(2)
(2006); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.l0(c)(l) (2005); N.J. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)(2) (2006); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.10(c)(I) (2006); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(e) (2005); 42 PA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)(I) (2004); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2005); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)
(2005).
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no part of the profits from that representation. 129 Each of these
states weighed the competing policy concerns and concluded not
only that clients should have broad discretion when choosing their
legal counsel, but also that law finns are capable of creating
effective screens to protect the interests of fanner and current
clients. 130
Each state that has opted to permit some fonn of screening has
done so in an independent manner, taking whatever steps that state
felt was necessary to protect clients' interests. l3l
In Clinard v. Blackwood, 132 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
demonstrated that although Tennessee's Rules of Professional
Conduct pennit screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest,
another, broader limitation on the use of screens exists under the
Rules. 133 The Court stated that "even 'if there is no actual conflict
of interest, the court must nonetheless consider whether conduct
has created an appearance of impropriety. ",134 So, even if the
screen used does rebut the presumption that confidential
infonnation has passed from the personally prohibited attorney to
the rest of the finn, "[t]he 'appearance of impropriety' is therefore
an indeEendent ground upon which disqualification may be
based."] 5 Tennessee uses the "appearance of impropriety"
standard 136 as an additional check when ethical issues arise, in
order to ensure that client confidences are protected without
depriving current clients of the representation of their choice. 137
Pennsylvania has permitted the use of screens to cure imputed
conflicts of interest for well over a decade. 138 Despite a case of
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

134.
135.
136.

137.
138.

See Charlotte K. Stretch, State Committees Review and Respond To Model Rules
Amendments, 15 PROF. LAW. 14, 15 (2004). Specifically, "Minnesota, North
Carolina and Oregon do not include provisions relating to the apportionment of
the fee. Illinois, Iowa, and Maryland do not require notice to the client regarding
the screen." Id.; see also ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b); IOWA
RULES PROf'L CONDUCT R. 32:1.10; MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. L10(c);
MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.I0(b); N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. !.lO(c); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(c).
See Shapiro, supra note 36, at 1309.
See Stretch, supra note 129, at 15.
46 S.w.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001).
See id. at 186 (asserting that "[e]thical rules must necessarily be broad and
flexible so as to have some application in various ethical dilemmas, and the
appearance of impropriety standard can work well when more specific rules may
be ineffective").
/d. at 187 (quoting State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2001».
Id. (quoting Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d at 312-13).
Specifically, the "appearance of impropriety" standard considers whether a
"reasonable layperson" with knowledge of the facts would find that the conflict
poses a potential and "substantial risk" to one of the clients, or offends the public
interest. See id.
/d. at 187-88.
See PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 Oeb) (2005).
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ineffective screening in 1992,\39 the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct continue to permit screening. 140
In
Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz,141 a
Pennsylvania law firm attempted to represent competing
companies at the same time, on the basis that it had supposedly
erected a "Chinese Wall" so that the respective lawyers workin§
for the competing companies were screened from each other. 14
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the firm's actions
constituted an ethical violation,143 but the court neither criticized
the concept of screening, nor challenged its validity.144 "Indeed,
the Maritrans situation is remarkable for its rarity. It is also
remarkable because, even after Maritrans, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court continued to permit lateral screening pursuant to
Rule 1.10(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct,
which the Court adopted in 1988.,,145
Notwithstanding Maritrans, evidence tends to show that few
complaints have arisen in states that permit nonconsensual
screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest. 146 The Ethics 2000
Commission's proposed amendment to Rule 1.10, that is, "to
139.

140.

141.
142.

143.

144.

145.
146.

See Maritrans OP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa.
1992). In particular, the Supreme Court of PeI1l1sylvania affirmed the trial court's
determination that, "Pepper [a co-defendant attorney] breached its obligation,
which was fortified by a specific promise, to keep from Messina [another codefendant attorney] that which was learned after the erection of the 'Chinese
Wall.'" Id at 1287.
See PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b). Rule 1.10(a) states that no lawyer
in a firm may represent a client when any other lawyer in the firm "practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so." See id R. 1.10(b). Additionally,
subsection b, addressing the use of screens, states:
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may
not knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially related
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was
associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is
material to the matter unless:
(I) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in
the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate client to
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
Id
602 A.2dat 1281.
See Maritrans, 602 A.2d at 1281 ("[T]he attorneys on one side of this 'Chinese
Wall' would not discuss their respective representations with the attorneys on the
other side.").
See id. at 1283-84 (citations omitted) ("Pepper and Messina, as attorneys, had a
duty to administer properly their responsibilities to respect the confidences of
Maritrans. ").
See id at 1288.
Creamer, supra note 21, at 21.
See id
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permit 'screening' of private lawyers moving between law firms,"
undoubtedly resulted, in part, from such lack of evidence. 147
VI. A NEED FOR CONSISTENCY
The ABA, as well as state bar associations, espouse the selfregulatory nature of the profession and enact model rules to protect
clients, lawyers, and the integrity of the legal profession; 148 yet, the
149
rejection of the use of SCreens defeats these very purposes.
Screens allow individuals to choose their representation, as well as
allow lawyers mobilit6' without compromising their ability to
represent new clients. 15
Ultimately, the ABA's rejection of the use of screens
demonstrates a distrust oflawyers, in their self-regulatory capacity,
to effectively erect SCreens. 151 Perhaps even mOre unsettling is the
inconsistent way in which this important ethical issue has been
analyzed, as well as put into practice. 152
A.

ABA Model Rule 1.11 Permits Screeningfor Government
Employees

Those who oppose the use of screens to cure imputed conflicts
of interest repeatedly argue that screening methods do not
sufficiently guarantee former clients that their confidential
communications will be protected when their lawyer migrates to a
new firm. 1S3 Although the House of Delegates rejected the Ethics
2000 Commission's proposal to amend Rule 1.10 to allow

147.
148.
149.
150.
lSI.

152.

153.

See id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. §§ 10-12 (2003).
See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21-22.
See id.
See id. at 20-21. A central argument of those opposed to screening is that lawyers
cannot be trusted to protect the confidences of former clients. ld. at 21.
Although the ABA House of Delegates does not provide an explanation for each
proposed amendment that it adopts or rejects, Commissioner fox's Minority
Report echoes the general sentiments of those opposed to screening. See
American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, hnp://abanet.org/cpr/e2kreport_home.html (follow 'This document" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 18,
2006); Fox. supra note 82. In particular, the Minority Report argues that,
"[r]arely if ever will violation of a screen be communicated to the former client
whose confidences it is intended to protect. A breach of a screen easi ly could be
inadvertent, and lawyers may hesitate to report it." ld. The Minority Report
quickly dismisses the Commission's argument that despite concerns about
enforcement and reporting, "the commission heard no evidence to suggest that
these objections have a factual basis in the experience of jurisdictions that permit
screening." See id.
See infra Part VI.A-B (discu5sing the use of screens for government employees,
as well as the lack of uniformity between state rules of professional conduct and
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
See supra Part II.B.3.
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screening,154 the ABA Model Rules do permit screening for
government employees. 155 Rule 1.11, entitled "Special Conflicts
of Interest for Fonner and Current Government Officers and
Employees,,,156 states that a lawyer who has fonnerly served as a
government employee is subject to Rule 1.9(C),157 and is prohibited
from representing a person in a matter in which the lawyer
participated "personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee . . . ." 158 With regard to screening, subsection (b) states
in pertinent part:
(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from
representation under paragraph (a), no
lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer
is associated may knowingly undertake
or continue representation in such a
matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely
screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the
fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to
the appropriate government agency to
enable it to ascertain compliance with
the provisions ~f this rule. I 59
Additionally, subsection (c) states that a lawyer who obtained
"confidential government infonnation about a person" while in a
government position is prohibited from representing "a private
client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in
which the infonnation could be used to the material disadvantage
of that person.,,160 However, the rule does not impute the
disqualification to the rest of the lawyer's finn if the disqualified
lawyer is "timely" screened from the matter and "apportioned no
part of the fee" from the representation. 161
Notwithstanding the fact that there is little difference
between screening a lawyer who migrates between a government
job and a private finn, and a lawyer who migrates between two

154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra Part III.B.
See MODEL RULES OF PRor'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (2003).
Jd.
Jd. R. 1.11(a)(I). Rule 1.9(c) addresses a lawyer's duties to fonner clients, and

prohibits a lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client, or whose current or
fonner finn has fonnerly represented a client, from using any infonnation related
to that representation to the disadvantage of the fonner client. See id. R. 1.9(c).
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. R. 1.1 I (a)(2).

Jd. R. 1.1 I (b).
Jd. R. 1. 11 (c).
Jd.
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private finns, one practice is allowed by the ABA Model Rules,
while the other has been rejected by the House of Delegates. 162
The comments to Model Rule 1.11 explain the policy issues
involved when dealing with government employees; in particular,
that screening is pennitted in order to avoid discouraging qualified
lawyers from entering public service. 163 Although such a policy
may be important, the theory behind it does not hold Up.164
Screening has been criticized because individuals are
skeptical that lawyers can be trusted to keep confidential
infonnation about a fOIDIer client when it could be used to their
advantage; 165 however, this argument makes no distinction
between the trustworthiness of a government employee and a
lawyer employed by a private finn. It is clear that the opponents of
lateral screening believe that the risk created when private lawyers
move between finns is too great to be cured by screening
mechanisms; however, these same opponents believe that conflicts
of interest can be adequately cured by screening mechanisms when
an attorney is moving between public and private sectors. 166 The
rationale behind the latter reasoning is to encourage mobility from
private to public employment, yet the conflict remains the same. 167
While it is important to encourage public service, the distinction
made between government lawyers and private attorneys, with
regard to screens, is an injustice of its own. 168 Moreover, "[i]f
fonner government lawyers can be trusted to comply with a
screening mechanism, then private lawyers can be trusted to do so
as well.,,169
162.

163.

164.

See id.; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 312-13 C"[MJost commentators
discern no reason to distinguish the moral uprightness of government lawyers
from that of private ones."), infra Part III.B (discussing the House of Delegates'
rejection of proposed Rule !.lO(c».
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. 4 (2003). "The provisions
for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the
disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public
service." Id.
The Minority Report attempts to explain the rationale behind the screening
exception for government employees. Fox, supra note 82. Specifically, it
explains that

the conclusion was reached that the government uniquely was a
different kind of client that might be asked to endure the indignity of
having its former lawyers screened in order to encourage the best and
the brightest to undertake public service. That exception reflected a
noble cause and it remains one today.
165.
166.
167.
168.

169.

Id.
Creamer, supra note 21, at 20-21.
Id. at 20-22.
ld. at 22.
See id.; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 312-13. ("[M]ost commentators
discern no reason to distinguish the moral uprightness of government lawyers
from that of private lawyers. ").
See Creamer, supra note 21, at 22.
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Additionally, ABA Model Rule 1.12 allows for the screening of
former judges, law clerks, arbitrators, mediators, and other thirdparty neutrals to prevent imputed disqualification. 17o In County of
Los Angeles v. Forsyth, 17l the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit suggested that ethical rules permitting screening for former
judges should, perhaps, be extended to private attorneys in order to
confront "[t]he changing realities of law practice" and the
"harsh[ness]" of disqualification. 172
Again, if screening is
permitted for former government employees, former judges, law
clerks, arbitrators, mediators, and third-party neutrals,173 private
attorneys should be governed by the same rules. It certainly seems
that ethical rules created to govern lawyers should generally be
applicable to all lawyers, all of the time.

B.

A Needfor Uniformity in the Courts

The lack of uniformity between state model rules of
professional conduct and the ABA's Model Rules, as well as
among state and federal courts is also damaging to the integrity of
the profession. 174 The fact that the drafters of Maryland's ethical
rules seem to trust Maryland lawyers enough to allow them to be
screened while the ABA does not generally afford that same right
170.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12 (2003). Rule 1.12(c) concerning
imputation states:

(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a
firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake
or continue representation in the matter unless:
(I) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any
appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the
provisions of this rule.
Id.

171.

172.

173.
174.

223 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the vicarious disqualification of
a firm does not automatically follow the personal disqualification of a former
settlement judge," when timely erected screens effectively rebut the presumption
of shared confidences).
Id. at 996-97. The court stated: "[w]e would nevertheless accept the costs of
automatic disqualification, if it were the only way to ensure that lawyers honor
their duties of confidentiality and loyalty. But it is not. A client's confidences
can also be kept inviolate by adopting measures to quarantine the tainted lawyer."
Id. at 996. Additionally, the court stated that "[t]he changing realities of law
practice call for a more functional approach to disqualification than in the past."
Id. at 997.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra Part VI. While this Comment analyzes how the inconsistencies
between states' ethics codes, with regard to the use of screens to cure imputed
conflicts of interest, reflect on the legal profession, it is important to note that this
is not the only area of substance in which states' ethics codes significantly
diverge. See, e.g., supra notes 132-37 (discussing the Tennessee "appearance of
impropriety" standard).
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to other lawyers,175 calls into question the legal profession's entire
ethical system.
When trying to determine ethical standards for lawyers one
must consider that:
While most state rules have adopted or
are derived from the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct or the ABA
Model Code, or a combination ofboth,
they are interpreted and applied
differently by a variety of federal and
state courts, as well as by various state
and local authorities. To further
complicate matters, some federal courts
have adopted and apply the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the state in
which they sit, while other federal
courts adhere to national standards of
attorney conduct promulgated by
national legal associations, such as the
ABA. Still other federal courts look to
state Rules of Professional Conduct but
are willing to consider national
standards. 176
It is difficult to comprehend how there can be such great
variation in ethical standards for one profession.

Some courts have opened the door to screenin procedures
when there is no rule permitting the use of screens. 1 7 In Doe v.
Perry Community School District, a case of first impression
concerning the use of screens, 178 the Supreme Court of Iowa stated
that screening can be used in limited situations to cure imputed
conflicts of interest. 179
Iowa's Rules of Professional
Responsibility mandate that if a lawyer is prohibited from
representing a client due to a conflict of interest, that lawyer's firm

9

175.
176.
177.
178.

179.

See supra Parts V & Vl.B, respectively.
Magid, supra note 108, at 41.
See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
650 N. W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa Sup. 2002). "We must determine whether a
screening mechanism known as a Chinese wall is sufficient to allow a law firm to
eliminate the conflict of an attorney who switched sides of representation during
the same case." Jd
Jd. at 601. Ultimately, the court concluded that screens can be used to cure
imputed conflicts of interest, as long as the two matters are not substantially
related. Jd In determining whether two matters are substantially related, the
court will consider "the nature and seope of the prior representation, the nature of
the present lawsuit, and whether confidences may have been disclosed." Jd at
600 (citing Hoffman v. Internal Med. P.C., 533 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995)). If the two matters are found to be substantially related then the conflict is
imputed to the firm, and disqualification is required. Jd. at 60 I.
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must also decline or withdraw from the representation. ISO While
the court found that the screen in this particular case was not
sufficient to prevent imputation because the matters were
substantially related,ISI the court did suggest that a screen erected
under the proper circumstances could be effective, I82
notwithstanding Iowa's general rule of professional responsibility
concerning imputed disqualification. 183
The Doe decision demonstrates that although courts may use the
ethical rules as the basis for ruling on a motion to disqualify, the
extent to which the rules are utilized is always subject to judicial
interpretation. 184 Attorneys may, in fact, be subject to discipline
for violating an ethical rule, while not necessarily being
disqualified from representing a particular client. lss Given the
internal nature of screening procedures, it has been suggested that
"[t]rial courts can influence the evolution of screening procedures
through case-by-case adequacy reviews" and "[s]tate supreme
courts can codify in their ethics rules screening guidelines that
provide complying firms with a safe harbor from the threat of
disqualification. ,,186
Although the Iowa court took a bold step, which will hopefully
encourage other courts to consider the effectiveness of screens, it is
also clear that "allowing screening by court decision, rather than
by a black letter rule, has its own pitfalls. Although the facts in the
recent Iowa case were clear from any standpoint, they may be
fuzzier the next time around.,,187
180.

l8l.

182.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR-105(E) (2002) ("If a
lawyer is required to decline employment or withdraw from employment, no
partner or associate of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm may accept or continue
such employment."), repealed by IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:l.7 &
32: 1.1 0 (2005) (prohibiting a firm from representing a former client of a former
associated lawyer only under specific circumstances).
Doe, 650 N.W.2d at 60l. In this case, the plaintiffs original attorney switched to
the defendant's firm in the middle of the litigation, so that even the firm
representing the defendant stipulated that the matters were substantially related.
Id. at 596-97, 598. Defendant's counsel argued, however, that even though the
matters were substantially related, the defendant's entire firm should not be
disqualified, because a "Chinese Wall" had been erected to protect confidences
communicated by the plaintiffs to their originallawyer.Id. at 600.
See id. at 601. The court concluded that in this case, because a substantial
relationship existed between the current and former representation, the
defendant's law firm must be disqualified. Id. at 599. When there is not a
substantial relationship between the current and former representation, the court
will consider whether a screen has been effective in protecting client confidences.
See id. at 600.
See IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS R. 5-105 (repealed
2005).
See supra text accompanying notes 178-82.
See In re Wenz, 87 P.3d 376, 380 (Mont. 2004).
Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the
"Ethical Infrastructure" ofLaw Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 263 (1998).
Gibeaut, supra note 48.
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The lack of uniformity among courts and among states where
ethics are concerned poses a great threat to the integrity of the
profession. 188 In a profession there should be certain ethical rules
from which no derogation is allowed, and professionals in a
position to create and amend these rules should strive for
uniformity.
VII. CONCLUSION
After an extensive review, the Ethics 2000 Commission
recommended an amendment to the ABA Model Rules that would
permit screening. 189 The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers
states that screens can be used to cure conflicts. 190 In writing the
Restatement, the ALI, described as "a frestigious group of
practicing lawyers, judges, and academics,,,1 I apparently weighed
the competing policy concerns surrounding the screening process,
and concluded that screens can effectively cure conflicts. 192
Moreover, the few states that do permit screening have yet to
encounter negative ethical repercussions. 193 It certainly appears
that:
[R]ecognition of the Chinese wall
defense thus offers a practicable
solution to a growing problem of
legal ethics. Without detracting from
the ethical standards of the legal
profession, expanded use of Chinese
walls will help to remove artificial
obstacles to the job mobility of
attorneys, private and public, while
securing to clients the maximum
right to counsel of their choice. 194
The lack of uniformity among sources of influence and
authority such as the courts, state rules of professional conduct, the
ABA Model Rules, and the Restatement of Law Governing
Lawyers undermines the integrity of the legal profession. 195
Rules governing lawyers should strive to protect clients and
promote the integrity of the profession. Notwithstanding the
relative lack of problems arising from the use of screens in the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

195.

See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 95, at 359.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.A-B.
Comment, supra note 6, at 715.
See discussion supra Part VI.B.
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sixteen states which permit them to cure conflicts,196 other states
have been reluctant to follow in the footsteps of those states. 197
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers promotes the
use of screens,198 and the Ethics 2000 Commission found screens
to be an effective method for curing conflicts before resorting to
disqualification. 199 The ABA Model Rules permit screening for
former government employees, judges, law clerks, arbitrators,
mediators, and other third-party neutrals, but decline to allow the
same rule to apply to private lawyers?OO At the same time, state
and federal courts look to varying national and state ethical
standards when evaluating potential misconduct. 201
While opponents of screening suggest that such a practice will
undermine the integrity of the profession and create the appearance
of impropriety,202 they also promote the various duties of lawyers
and the self-regulatory nature of the profession. 203 This lack of
uniformity and clear distrust of lawyers' abilities to construct and
respect screens directly conflicts with the goals and principles as
stated in the ABA Model Rules?04 It is, in fact, these actions
which undermine the integrity of the profession.
Erin A. Cohn t

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
20 I.

202.
203.

See discussion supra Part V.A-B.
See discussion supra Part V.B.
See supra Part IV.
SeesupraPartIlI.A.
See supra Part VI.A.
See supra Part Vl.B.
See supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text.
See Fox, supra note 82 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmb!. § 12
(2003».

204.

t

See Robert W. Meserve, Chair's Introduction to ABA Commission on Evaluation
ofProfessional Standards, xi, xii (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,
Pmb!. § 10.
J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., College
of the Holy Cross, 2003.

